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Abstract  7 
While there is growing research on online politics in China some political uses of the Internet 8 
have tended to be overlooked. The focus of this article is on an emerging phenomenon in 9 
Chinese cyberspace, the Human Flesh Search Engine (HFSE), a term first used by the 10 
Chinese media to refer to the practice of online searching for people or ‘human hunting’. 11 
While existing examinations have focused on breaches of individual privacy by these so 12 
called online ‘vigilantes’ this study focuses on the ability of  HFSE to reveal norms 13 
transgressions by public officials and lead to their removal. In order to give readers a 14 
comprehensive overview of what an HFSE is, the first section of this article provides basic 15 
information about it. In the second part, 20 well-documented HFSE examples are listed to 16 
show their varying aims and then HFSEs which focus on local governments and officials are 17 
shown to highlight the political dimensions of HFSE. In the third section, four case studies  of 18 
government/official-focused HFSE are explored in detail to show political HFSEs’ internal 19 
processes and underlying mechanisms.  20 
Introduction 21 
The term Human Flesh Search Engine (HFSE) might be more at home in pages of a horror 22 
novel but was originally applied by the Chinese media to refer to the practice of online 23 
searching for people or ‘human hunting’. The term shot to prominence outside China when 24 
the non-Chinese media covered the story of Wang Fei, a Beijing man who was vilified by 25 
online mobs after his wife committed suicide, allegedly due to his infidelity (Fletcher 2008). 26 
In the UK, a headline in the Guardian on this incident noted: ‘Chinese online vigilantes hunt 27 
human flesh’, it continued ‘Forget the FBI or Jack Bauer, no one tracks down a miscreant as 28 
fast as Chinese vigilantes’ (Branigan 2008a; see also Downey 2010, Ransom 2008). Another 29 
article from The Times Online noted: ‘Human Flesh Search Engine: Chinese vigilantes that 30 
hunt victims on the web’ (Fletcher 2008). The story of online vigilantes hunting down an 31 
individual, identifying him, where he lived, and encouraging public condemnation of his 32 
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behaviour also appeared in the New York Times, which observed that HFSE was a ‘form of 1 
online vigilante justice where Internet users hunt down and punish people who have attracted 2 
their wrath. The goal is to get the targets of a search fired from their jobs, shamed in front of 3 
their neighbours, run out of town. It is crowd-sourced detective work, pursued online – with 4 
offline results’ (Downey 2010). Examples like this are of course not restricted to China. 5 
Solove starts his book The Future of Reputation with the example of a Korean girl who was 6 
subject to the opprobrium of Internet users after pictures of her refusing to clean-up her dog’s 7 
faeces on a subway train emerged online. 8 
Within hours, she was labeled as dog shit girl and her pictures and parodies were anywhere. Within 9 
days, her identity and her past were revealed. Requests for information about her parents and relatives 10 
started popping up and people started to recognize her by the dog and the bag she was carrying as well 11 
as her watch, clearly visible in the original picture. All mentions of privacy invasion were shouted 12 
down….The common excuse for their behavior was that the girl doesn’t deserve privacy (Solove 2007, 13 
p1).  14 
 15 
As a result of embarrassment and pressure caused by the shaming and criticizing, the ‘dog 16 
shit girl’ dropped out of her university (see also Shirkey 2008).  17 
In the Chinese context there is a concern that this represents a new kind of online collective 18 
action that is disturbing. Domestic media, such as the official news agency Xinhua in one 19 
article likened HFSE to Internet lynching (Bai and Ji 2008); it noted: ‘The ‘human flesh 20 
search engine’ is not the familiar search engine from Baidu and Google, but the idea of a 21 
search engine employing thousands of individuals all mobilized with one aim, to dig out facts 22 
and expose them to the baleful glare of publicity’. This article argued that the ‘Internet gave 23 
people a disguise, enabling power without responsibility’. It also cited the example of the 24 
Wang Fei case in which after his personal details were exposed on the Internet, Wang Fei 25 
was harassed by people who wrote graffiti on the door of his parent’s house accusing them of 26 
killing Wang’s wife, and who phoned his boss asking him to lay off Wang. This incident both 27 
in China and abroad was framed in terms of vigilantes and invasion of personal privacy, 28 
indeed, Wang sued the Tianya and Daqi (two major online communities in China) for 29 
initially allowing circulation of his personal details and infringing his privacy and reputation. 30 
This, however, is not the only case of HFSE and concerns about personal privacy and 31 
harassment by online mobs overlook an important political dimension of HFSEs, which is to 32 
set their sights on misbehaviour by public officials.  33 
In December 2008, a Chinese citizen anonymously posted the travel expense claims of 34 
government officials accidentally found on a subway train in Shanghai. The documents 35 
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showed that a group of officials from two local governments had taken lavish ‘study tours’ to 1 
the United States and Canada where they spent public money on visiting major tourist 2 
attractions. After these documents surfaced, details of these officials were exposed by other 3 
Internet users who knew the officials whose names were shown in the documents. Chinese 4 
Internet users discussed the alleged corruption in online forums and organized online petition 5 
asking the two local governments concerned to penalize their officials. Under public pressure, 6 
the two local governments dismissed the exposed officials and a series of inquiries were 7 
launched to ensure best practice in the relevant departments (Canaves 2008).  8 
 9 
Here we have an example where HFSE revealed a transgression of the rules, creating 10 
pressure on government which led to the removal of public officials for corrupt practices. In 11 
other words, there might well have been a breach of individual privacy by these so-called 12 
‘vigilantes’ but the result was that corrupt public officials were held to account. Official 13 
corruption is one of the gravest challenges in contemporary China and public officials have 14 
been the main perpetrators of corruption in China for the past 20 years (Guo, Y. 2008).  15 
According to the data shown on the website of the Ministry of Supervision of The People’s 16 
Republic of China, in 30 years from 1982 to 2011, there were about 4.2 million officials who 17 
have received different forms of punishment for corrupt practices (e.g. dismissal, inter-party 18 
warning, expulsion, jail sentence). According to Koblitz et al. (2012), in 2011, 142,893 19 
officials were punished for corruption and disciplinary violations, far exceeding the number 20 
of 106,626 in 2009. There may still be countless uncovered cases which are beyond the 21 
attention and capability of central government that has being making effort to regulate and 22 
supervise its bureaucratic system. In the light of corruption as being a serious problem in 23 
China, it is important to examine the way HFSE are being used to hold political officials and 24 
local governments to account. Based on a systematic gathering exercise the next section 25 
examines 20 incidents of HFSE to establish the extent to which the above political example is 26 
a prominent focus for HFSE. 27 
The different types of HFSE 28 
As identified HFSE is more than merely the online bullying of individuals by online 29 
vigilantes, it can also take on a political dimension. However, there is no readily available 30 
database classifying the different types of HFSE. How many are focused on office holders 31 
and how many on members of the public? This section examines 20 well-documented cases 32 
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of HFSE (between 2001 and 2011) to establish for the first time how many cases have been 1 
focused on wrongdoing by public officials. While the issues addressed by HFSE vary widely 2 
it can be defined as follows: in simple terms a HFSE involves a group of Internet users 3 
working together (in a variety of ways), using their contacts (on and off the Internet) and 4 
conventional search engines to achieve a common goal (broadly defined). Often triggered in 5 
response to wrongdoing or transgression of generally accepted norms (but not exclusively so) 6 
they aim to dig out information andexpose it to the public, in order to obtain  some form of 7 
redress. HFSE involves the pattern of crowdsourcing, which means separately designated 8 
tasks in any job are outsourced to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form 9 
of an open call (Howe 2006). HFSE is based on the participation of geographically dispersed 10 
Internet users who respond to a series of calls publicized in an online forum.  11 
The following table shows basic information of 20 cases of HFSE, which have been 12 
identified via systematic  searching. The search for possible cases started with an Internet 13 
search. Google was the most frequently used Internet search engine to look for foreign 14 
material on HFSE, and Baidu, a Chinese search engine was used to look for relevant Chinese 15 
materials. The main keywords for using searching engines are ‘Human Flesh Search Engine’ 16 
in English and ‘人肉搜索’ in Chinese. The Nexis database was also used to look for English 17 
coverage on HFSE. The Internet searching revealed a wide range of possible cases each of 18 
which needed to be checked. Denzin (1978, p. 294-307) extends the idea of triangulation 19 
beyond its conventional association with research methods and designs by distinguishing four 20 
forms of triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theoretical triangulation 21 
and methodological triangulation. In this research, data triangulation is employed, which 22 
entails gathering information of each single case from multiple sources. The details of each 23 
case presented later are mainly based on numerous news articles published in Chinese and 24 
English. Information from multiple sources may overlap, but this enables a robust database 25 
and confirmation of events. There is also a process of condensing and packaging all the 26 
available information to make it fit the story-telling format of each case and better display its 27 
internal process.  28 
 29 
[Table 1 about here]  30 
 31 
Empirically, there are more than 20 examples, but only those  listed here have been carefully 32 
triangulated (Denzin, 1978). These are the ones that have been corroborated through multiple 33 
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sources. Among the cases listed above, there are 12 non-government/official focused HFSEs 1 
and 8 government/official-focused ones. The former have aims varying from tracking down 2 
immoral citizens, to fact-checking credibility of an announcement made by a member of the 3 
public, the news content of national media, or looking for missing person; for 4 
government/official-focused ones  the aims  range from  tracking down corrupt government 5 
officials to fact-checking government announcements. The two types of HFSE all depend on 6 
the web-based crowdsourcing but have different focus: while the government/official-focused 7 
HFSE reflects how the Chinese Internet users respond to and interact with the government, 8 
the non-government/official-focused HFSE illustrates more the prevailing social-cultural 9 
norms in Chinese society stressed by Confucianism (e.g. loyalty, righteousness, kindness and 10 
sincerity), the violation of which incurs public opprobrium.  11 
Political dimension of HFSE 12 
The table above identified 8 cases of ‘government/official focused’ HFSE. This section 13 
examines these cases in more detail. The following table provides more information about 14 
each case. 15 
 16 
[Table 2 about here] 17 
 18 
Basically, the table shows there are two types of government/official-focused HFSE, 19 
differentiated according to their aims: one is punishing corrupt officials and another the fact-20 
checking of announcements made by government or the police. For the first type, Internet 21 
users tracked down corrupt government officials in the hope of getting them punished. For 22 
the second type, Internet users search for evidence to corroborate the announcement made by 23 
government or police, and reveal if there was an underlying official deception or a cover-up. 24 
In the following section, two cases of target-punishing HFSE and two cases of fact-checking 25 
HFSE are examined, which clearly illustrate the internal processes at work in the two types of 26 
government/official focused HFSE. 27 
While this article is interested in successful manifestations of the HFSE phenomenon it 28 
should be noted that it does not look at cases that did not get off the ground, which is beyond 29 
the scope of this paper nor at cases that did not end in the punishment or the contradiction of 30 
public officials. There are two cases which failed in this latter regard. In case 1 of Table 2, 31 
the woman targeted by HFSE denied that she was the person in the evidence presented. The 32 
woman’s claims and lack of evidence to the contrary and lack of evidence about the high-33 
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level government official she was supposedly having a relationship with seems to have been 1 
enough to create some doubt. The HFSE generated visibility of a woman’s claims on a 2 
sensitive subject but could not find further evidence to substantiate the original claims either 3 
because they were bogus or the smoking gun was not attainable and so it came to an end. In 4 
the second case, case 7 table 2, it seems that the HFSE was stopped by overwhelming proof 5 
that the youngest mayor in China was not appointed due to family connections but rather his 6 
capabilities. Both types of HFSE do not necessarily end in punishment or the contradiction of 7 
public officials claims, the final stage is dependent on the information that can be uncovered 8 
by the HFSE and the response of the offline authorities. 9 
Corrupt official jailed after his careless words lead to evidence of corruption 10 
On 10th December 2008 (Moore 2008), Zhou Jiugeng, the chief of the Real Estate 11 
Management Bureau in Jiangning district of Nanjin City (the capital of Jiangsu province, one 12 
of the most developed provinces in China), stated when interviewed by journalists that the 13 
Real Estate Management Bureau would closely monitor the real estate market in Jiangning 14 
and punish real estate developers who sold houses at lower than cost price (due to high house 15 
price, in some cities of China such as Jiangning, many houses could not be sold, pushing real 16 
estate developers to think about other ways such as lowering house prices to relieve the 17 
problem of overstock). After Zhou’s statement had been widely reported by the media, he 18 
became the target of Internet users who were displeased with his insensitivity to house prices 19 
that had greatly exceeded ordinary people’s ability to buy  - a source of general grievance 20 
among the Chinese public (Wang 2011; Wu 2010). People believed that the government 21 
should take some measures to lower house prices to a generally affordable level rather than 22 
encourage real estate developers to keep the price high. The indignation spread on the 23 
Internet immediately after media reporting. On 11th December 2008, an Internet user 24 
nicknamed xiao hua ban li posted in an online forum, ‘Nanjing Focus Estate Net’, the article, 25 
‘Eight questions to the chief of Jiangning Real Estate Management Bureau’, which was then 26 
republished to other online forums, such as Tianya, Kaidi and Mop, three major Chinese 27 
Bulletin Board System (BBS) websites. On the same day, another Internet user xuan chuan ji 28 
sheng 9 published in the Kaidi forum an article titled, ‘Calling for Internet heroes to track 29 
down the chief of the Real Estate Management Bureau: Zhou Jiugeng’. This was then taken 30 
as a call to launch an HFSE to target this government official (Zhu 2008). The question on 31 
Zhou’s remark by traditional media started nearly at the same time as Chinese Internet users 32 
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started to express their doubt online (Yang 2008), but most of the exposure was done by 1 
Internet users.   2 
In the following days, more and more information about Zhou Jiugeng was revealed. On 12th 3 
December 2008, an Internet user bao cun 100 nian revealed in the Kaidi forum that Zhou 4 
smoked luxury brand cigarettes worth 1500 Yuan (roughly USD 238) a pack (Zhu 2008). 5 
This Internet user uploaded pictures of Zhou attending a government meeting with a pack of 6 
luxury brand cigarettes on the table beside him and commented that a government official on 7 
a normal salary could not afford the most expensive brand cigarettes in Nanjing. On 15th 8 
December, an Internet user Cheyou007 published a post titled ‘Zhou Jiugeng smokes luxury 9 
cigarettes and wears an expensive watch’. Chenyou007 found some old newspaper pictures 10 
which showed Zhou wearing a Vacheron Constantin watch worth 100,000 Yuan (roughly 11 
USD 15,891). The following day, an Internet user Guo Xinpeng sent an email to the governor 12 
of Jiangning District, reporting Zhou Jiugeng’s misbehaviour and requesting a throughout 13 
inquiry into him (Zeng 2009).  14 
On 17th December, an Internet user wei da de ren min revealed that Zhou’s brother was a real 15 
estate developer and stressed that Zhou’s remark on the real estate market was relevant to his 16 
brother and intended to protect his family’s interests. It was then shown that Zhou’s son was 17 
the owner of a construction company (News Morning 2008). On 20th December, ten days 18 
after Zhou’s remark was broadcast, the government of Jiangning District first responded to 19 
the online uproar by announcing that they had started an inquiry into Zhou Jiugeng. On 28th 20 
December 2008, Zhou was dismissed due to his inappropriate remarks and for misusing 21 
public funds to buy luxury goods. As the investigation got more detailed, more evidence of 22 
Zhou’s corruption surfaced. According to the investigation result, from 2003 to 2008, Zhou 23 
accepted more than 1 million Yuan (roughly USD 158,916) from others. On 10th October 24 
2009, Zhou was sentenced to 11 years in jail for corruption (Wang and Cai 2009). 25 
Zhou would not have been punished if public attention had focused only on his inappropriate 26 
remark, however, it was Internet users angered at his remark, and searching for and finding 27 
photos of him, which raised suspicions of corruption. The photographs generated public 28 
opprobrium about corruption and led Internet users to work together to find more 29 
photographic evidence. The example illustrates the way HFSE is used to hold often 30 
unaccountable corrupt officials to account. As noted, official corruption is a major source of 31 
public grievance in China, however, it is often unchecked by official sources and official 32 
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media (Lum 2006). If official channels for removing corrupt officers are not available or not 1 
effective, then unofficial channels become an important outlet. The incompetence of the 2 
political system in dealing with corruption (Pei 2006) and the strictly censored media 3 
environment (Lagerkvist 2005; Zhao 2004) are handicapping official exposure of corruption 4 
and encouraging the Chinese public to look for additional outlets to gain justice.   5 
Political officer sacked 24 hours after restaurant cctv footage is exposed online 6 
While the first example focuses on financial malfeasance the second concerns the abuse of 7 
power. On the evening of 29th October 2008, Lin Jiaxiang, then the party secretary and 8 
deputy director-general of Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administration (in Guangdong 9 
Province), was quarrelling in a restaurant lobby with a young girl’s parents who insisted that 10 
Lin had assaulted their 11 year old daughter in the corridor leading to the men’s toilet. Facing 11 
the complaining parents, Lin said: ‘I did that, so what? How much money do you want? .... 12 
Do you know who I am? I am from the Ministry of Transport. I rank as high as your mayor. 13 
How dare you quarrel with me?’ A camera in the restaurant lobby filmed the incident and the 14 
footage was posted anonymously the next day on an online forum Aoyi (the news portal 15 
website founded by the South News Group based in Guangdong). One hour later a journalist 16 
of the Southern Metropolitan Daily published a report entitled ‘A little girl assaulted in a 17 
restaurant by a man on the way to toilet’. Until this moment, nobody had known the identity 18 
of this man. 19 
At around 22:30 pm on the same day after the first media report concerning Lin was 20 
published, a posting emerged in the Aoyi online forum with the title ‘Human Flesh Search 21 
Engine, let’s track down the self-called high-level official’ (Feng 2008). In the morning of 22 
31st October 2008, many news websites and online forums in China reproduced this story and 23 
many mainstream media immediately followed as well (Feng 2008). On the same day, an 24 
Internet user osnuigj revealed the man’s identity, and another Internet user provided an audio 25 
clip recording the dialogue between the man and the girl’s parents in local police station, 26 
which showed that the man wanted to pay for his misdeed but that it was refused by the girl’s 27 
parents.  28 
In the afternoon of 31st October 2008, Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administration admitted 29 
that the man in the footage was their officer Lin Jiaxiang. They announced that Lin had been 30 
suspended from his position and that a team organized by the Ministry of Transport from 31 
Beijing had arrived in Shenzhen to investigate. Many Chinese Internet users were not 32 
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satisfied with this and insisted that Lin had committed child molestation but was shielded 1 
from punishment. On 5th November 2008, the Shenzhen police held a news conference to 2 
announce the result of their follow-up investigation. Lin was dismissed from his government 3 
position for his inappropriate behaviour in public. It was also announced that there was not 4 
sufficient evidence of assault as the camera in that restaurant did not cover the passage 5 
leading to toilet, and thus was unable to show if the assault really happened or not. The case 6 
against Lin for the charge of child molestation was finally rejected. Meanwhile, persistent 7 
Internet users began searching for details of the woman shown in the video having dinner 8 
with Lin, who in the view of Chinese Internet users was probably Lin’s mistress (Feng 2008). 9 
But she was proved later by police investigation to be just Lin’s friend.  10 
Lin Jiaxiang was finally dismissed from his job. Again we see that under pressure of the 11 
HFSE and in this case some media outlets, a public official was held to account for his 12 
activities. The media though only became involved after the initial story had emerged online 13 
and initiated the search, it would be wrong to suggest that HFSE is the sole means of holding 14 
officials to account, but in these carefully substantiated examples they can be seen as a force 15 
that can bring some accountability. The goal of these HFSEs outlined is not just to complain 16 
but to ensure that there is some form of just outcome. The general grievance of the Chinese 17 
public about political malfeasance and the failure of government to discipline officials drives 18 
actors to look for justice. The strictly censored media environment (Lagerkvist 2005; Zhao 19 
2004) and the poorly functioning judicial system (Ackerman 1999; Shen 2012) mean there 20 
are few alternative outlets. Finally, the Internet turns out to be possibly the most convenient 21 
and effective channel to enable actors to achieve their goal (there is also online censorship, 22 
but not as strict and insurmountable as censorship on conventional media). As noted, HFSE is 23 
also used in a fact-checking capacity, which is illustrated by the following two cases.  24 
 25 
Government credibility and the fake tiger photo 26 
On 12th October 2007, the Provincial Forestry Bureau in Shaanxi province of China 27 
publicized via a news conference two South China Tiger photos taken by Zhou Zhenglong, a 28 
hunter in Zhenpin county of Shaanxi province (Shan 2007). During this conference, senior 29 
officials of the Shaanxi Provincial Forestry Bureau (SPFB) announced that according to the 30 
opinion of three zoologists, these photos confirmed the existence of the wild South China 31 
Tiger in the forest of Zhenpin County (this place has historically been seen as the main 32 
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habitat of wild South China Tiger). Immediately after this news conference as well as news 1 
coverage on it, the two tiger photos rapidly spread on and offline. However, a posting 2 
published on October 15th 2007 in Tianya forum caught people’s attention by its title ‘South 3 
China Tiger, another faked news story?’ Its author highlighted six problems with these photos. 4 
The emergence of this posting became a turning point, after which more and more 5 
questioning voices emerged. On the same day of 15th October, the news about ‘the wild South 6 
China Tiger was found in Shaanxi’ was reproduced by several newspapers and broadcasts, 7 
intensifying the public questioning of these tiger photos’ credibility (No author 2007).  8 
On 23rd October, Zhou and few officials from local government went to the National Forestry 9 
Department (NFD) in Beijing to submit these photos, and more importantly, to apply for 10 
administrative permission to construct a conservation area for the South China Tiger in 11 
Zhenpin County (No author 2007). Commonly, it would be expected that the involvement of 12 
central government could bring a convincing conclusion about these photos’ authenticity. 13 
However, what disappointed the public was that the NFD was unable to tell if these photos 14 
were real or not; what it could do, as its spokesman stressed, was to make sure that there was 15 
a real population of wild South China Tiger in Zhenpin rather than testing if these photos 16 
were real. The response from the central authorities and Zhou and local officials’ insistence 17 
of the tiger photos being real fuelled Internet users’ passion to look for new evidence to 18 
disprove their statements. There was a second turning point when an Internet user showed on 19 
15th November 2007 that the original image of the tiger may have been copied from an old 20 
Chinese lunar year calendar, a screenshot of which was also uploaded (Tan 2007). Then, 21 
more and more Internet users joined the online investigation, discussing and analysing how 22 
these tiger photos had been faked (Guo 2010).  23 
Besides the online uproar, offline investigation was also started. Civic investigation teams 24 
were organized by media organizations and professional associations. As the online uproar 25 
extended to offline, the NFD finally issued a demand that the Shaanxi Provincial Forestry 26 
Bureau should check again carefully the credibility of the tiger photos and publicize the result 27 
as soon as possible. The case finally ended with local government’s confession that these 28 
tiger photos were not real; thirteen officials in the Shaanxi Provincial Forestry Bureau were 29 
dismissed for their irresponsibility in photo evaluation and for their holding a news 30 
conference without administrative permission; three officials of the Zhenpin County 31 
government were dismissed for faking relevant reports; hunter Zhou Zhenlong was also 32 
sentenced to 30 months in jail for the charge of faking tiger photos (Ding 2008).   33 
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The ‘hide and seek’ event 1 
This example illustrates a fact-checking HFSE that targeted an attempted cover-up of a 2 
prisoner’s death in police custody. On February 13th 2009, the Yunnan.cn (the news website 3 
sponsored by the Yunnan Daily News Group in Yunnan Province) reported that Li Qiaomin, 4 
a 24 year old man, detained in prison for illegal logging, had died of a severe brain injury in 5 
hospital (Wang 2009a). Local police explained that Li’s brain injury was due to his head 6 
hitting the wall after he was kicked by another prisoner when playing the game ‘hide and 7 
seek’ (Li, J. 2009). However, the police’s claim was greeted with scepticism. Many Internet 8 
users expressed their doubts over the official claim about Li’s death (Li, J .S. 2009, Wang 9 
2009a).  10 
The prisoner’s death then became a public hot topic and the Chinese phrase ‘躲猫猫’ (‘hide 11 
and seek’) became one of the most popular online phrases in Chinese cyberspace in 2009 12 
(Wang 2009b). In online forums and chat groups, there were intense discussions on the ‘hide 13 
and seek’ event. In the afternoon on 13th February 2009, only a few hours after the official 14 
claim was publicized, a local online forum devoted to the discussion proposed launching 15 
HFSE to uncover the truth underlying Li’s death (Zhou 2009).  Facing intensified online 16 
outrage and growing media question, on 19th February 2009, the Yunnan Provincial 17 
Propaganda Department published an announcement on its website about recruiting members 18 
of a civic investigation team dedicated to investigate Li’s death (Xie, L. D. 2009). One day 19 
after, the civic team was established and started its investigation; in the morning of 21st 20 
February 2009, the civic team publicized its report, which however produced more questions 21 
(Dong 2009).  22 
The proposal of organizing a civic investigation team by the Yunnan government was 23 
initially aimed to calm down the online uproar concerning Li’s death and prevent its 24 
reputation from being questioned and damaged by public discussion. However, its failure to 25 
uncover the ‘truth’ raised the question of an official cover-up. The team members were 26 
labelled ‘insiders’ who allegedly kept the truth hidden intentionally. Thus Chinese Internet 27 
users launched HFSE to search for the real identities of the team members, who were found 28 
to be mainly journalists and webmasters and were further shamed by Internet users insisting 29 
they were ‘insiders’ (Zhang 2009). On 24th February 2009, the website of Jinning government 30 
(the county where the prison was located) was hacked by Chinese Internet users who changed 31 
all the contents shown on its homepage into one term ‘躲猫猫’ (‘hide and seek’) (Guan 2009). 32 
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Pressured by on and offline questioning, on 27th February 2009, the Yunnan provincial 1 
government held a news conference, announcing that instead of accepting the investigation 2 
result given by the Jinning County Public Security Bureau (from which the initial official 3 
claim that Li died of ‘hide and seek’ came), the Yunnan Provincial Public Security Bureau 4 
concluded Li had been beaten to death by other prisoners. Meanwhile, it was also announced 5 
that the vice-director of the Jinning Public Security Bureau and the chief of Jinning County 6 
Prison were dismissed; two prison guards were sentenced to jail for the charge of 7 
malfeasance (Luo 2009).   8 
There are offline factors that need to be considered, which could explain why Chinese 9 
citizens chose to question rather than accept official claims. The Internet enables online 10 
cooperation but has no default capability of indicating what is suspicious and should be 11 
questioned. One alternative explanation might be the public distrustfulness of the Chinese 12 
political system, the result of a series of actions of local and regional governments, such as 13 
building chemical plants with potential environment damage (Yuan 2011), using public funds 14 
to construct luxury government building (Xiao 2011), land acquisition without reasonable 15 
compensation for peasants (Tan 2012) and forced house demolition without properly 16 
resettling residents (Tian 2010). These examples, along with similar others unmentioned here, 17 
have made Chinese citizens automatically regard government statements and actions as 18 
pursuing political interest rather than public interest. The cases of ‘South China Tiger’ and 19 
‘Hide and Seek’ are based on such a general distrust of government. The application of 20 
Internet in these two cases aired and amplified the distrust as well as the embarrassment 21 
caused by those official claims, pushing the Shaanxi and Yunnan provincial governments to 22 
confess their local departments’ deception.  23 
Discussion and Conclusion  24 
The four cases elaborated above highlight the internal processes of the target-punishing and 25 
fact-checking government/official focused HFSEs. At each stage there is a gathering of 26 
information and exposure. Although each does not share the same number of stages a basic 27 
sequential structure can be identified. Each starts with a trigger that emerged offline, 28 
presenting a certain kind of transgressive behaviour, followed by the revelation of  29 
transgression – this is usually some form of hard evidence, a sound recording, photograph, 30 
document – or a questionable statement by an official. This initial revelation might be partial 31 
or seen as questionable. This provokes the second phase - a response from Internet users. If 32 
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the corrupt official is still unnamed the second phase initiates the hunt to identify the culprit, 1 
if the official is known it may provoke a trawling for further information. Evidence that might 2 
undermine a government claim is sought out. This phase may well vary in time scale but 3 
involves frequent requests for information amongst online community members. The move to 4 
the third phase is triggered by the exposure of more contextualizing information, a name, a 5 
rank, the names of others involved who know the official, or evidence that contradicts the 6 
government official’s claim. The case can no longer be ignored by officials; they have to 7 
respond. This response might well bring the incident to an end but if justice is not seen to be 8 
done it might provoke further opprobrium and calls for justice.  9 
The article has shown that the Internet role in Chinese politics has stretched beyond issues of 10 
liberation and the public sphere. HFSEs are being used to hold corrupt officials to account 11 
and check out government claims. These developments are driven by a complex series of 12 
factors. All HFSEs have a trigger which is key to understanding their motivation. A key 13 
trigger of these government/official-focused HFSEs is the on-going endemic official 14 
corruption and low government credibility. The existing regulatory system often fails to 15 
identify and/or punish corrupt political officials (He 2000), leading to a certain number of 16 
government officials’ misdeeds going unpunished. According to Pei, on average, 140,000 17 
party officials and members were caught in corruption scandals each year in the 1990s, and 18 
5.6 percentage of these were criminally prosecuted; in 2004, 170,850 party officials and 19 
members were implicated, but only 4,915 (or 2.9 per cent) were subject to criminal 20 
prosecution (2006, p.5). Corruption is the major (if not the only) concern of the Chinese 21 
public with the political system in China, even the new Chinese president Xi Jinping states 22 
that the Chinese Communist Party faces a serious problem of corruption that could kill the 23 
party and ruin the country if it remains unresolved (No author 2012). While the culture of 24 
official impunity is thriving in China (Pei 2006), another major concern is also reflected by 25 
HFSE, namely the credibility of official claims, due to the fact that local governments usually 26 
put expediency ahead of transparency (Fu 2012). 27 
Another key trigger is the lack of alternative means for holding corrupt officials to account or 28 
questioning official claims. This is the main reason why Chinese citizens resorted to the 29 
Internet to expose and punish government officials misdoings. The media environment in 30 
China, which has not been totally opened up due to strict censorship, is unable to be an 31 
alternative channel of exposing in the first place. The cases above show that mass media were 32 
involved not at the start but once the story was running. In a non-democratic setting such as 33 
14 
 
China, the strictly censored media environment makes journalists carefully select their topic 1 
and they are required to comply with the party line, even though there has been a widespread 2 
marketization of the media (Tang and Sampson 2012, p.458). With regard to sensitive 3 
political issues, Chinese journalists, when facing restrictions, regard tapping into public 4 
opinion expressed on the Internet as a tactic to cater for a wider audience while bypassing 5 
potential political danger (de Burgh 2003; Tong and Sparks 2009). Therefore, we are able to 6 
see that the traditional media, although not doing much initial exposure, were actively 7 
engaging in the government/official focused HFSE in terms of mainly reporting and 8 
sometimes investigating after the Internet users had set the agenda ahead of journalists. Their 9 
involvement actually intensified the public discussion on particular issues and acted as a 10 
‘pressure cooker’, working with the online population jointly pushing the target to provide 11 
redress.   12 
HFSE is an online phenomenon but also one that cannot be divorced from the political 13 
environment. They need to be seen alongside the offline protests that have occurred in China. 14 
The number of protests in China, in urban and rural areas, ranging from rebellion, riot, and 15 
demonstration to petition, strike, has been increasing (Yang 2009). The issues involved 16 
include house demolition, land acquisition, environment protection, labour welfare, policy 17 
enforcement, village elections, etc., which all have constituted the main sources of conflict in 18 
Chinese offline protests. Moreover, the political environment means that the HFSE has been 19 
given a space to target local governments and individual officials but a line seems to be 20 
drawn at central government at least no cases we could find focused on central govenrment. 21 
In other words, even though there is strict control in Chinese cyberspace the Internet policy in 22 
China is fluid and calculating; the Chinese central government generally lets HFSE occur 23 
because it views the Internet as a channel to monitor and discipline its local departments and 24 
cadres. Of course if its legitimacy and stability are challenged by an HFSE then its response 25 
would be different and it is hard think that HFSE actor’s anonymity could be maintained. 26 
Drawing on Andrejevic (2005) one could argue that HFSE participants are little more than 27 
‘the eyes and ears’ of central government co-opted into the sousveillance of local government 28 
officials. However, we would argue, based on the HFSE we examined and as far we can tell, 29 
HFSE were not organised by central government and participants were not enlisted in 30 
response to a central government call for action. Underlying them is a genuine citizen anger 31 
and resentment at the transgression of particular norms by public officials and a desire to 32 
bring about some resolution. 33 
15 
 
The HFSE demonstrates the power of the citizens using the internet to mobilize and form 1 
groups in response to a particular claim or transgression. But the Internet is a necessary but 2 
not sufficient condition: the occurrence of HFSE is the result of a combination of online and 3 
offline factors, such as the lack of formal channels for holding corrupt officials to account, 4 
low government credibility that pushes Chinese citizens to question rather than accept official 5 
claims, the strictly censored traditional media making the Internet become an additional and 6 
desirable channel to expose in the first place, as well as probably the most basic one, namely 7 
the imperfect Chinese political system that has brought about and also failed to deal with 8 
official corruption and public distrustfulness. HFSE’s ‘being online’ characteristic makes the 9 
politically-focused HFSE difficult for Chinese authority to control (due to online anonymity 10 
making the identification of particular person online much more complicated than offline), 11 
and its existence is also temporary, which emerges after a specific trigger and then stops once 12 
some kind of response has been solicited. Giving the growing access to the Internet and the 13 
fundamental political challenges China faces HFSE is a phenomenon of online politics that is 14 
set to continue.  15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
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Table 1: The Twenty cases of HFSE 1 
Types of 
HFSE 
Numb
er 
Date The Aim 
Non-
governm
ent/offici
al 
focused 
HFSE 
 
 
12 
 
 
2001 Fact checking of an announcement by an Internet user in Mop online forum (Wang and 
Zhang 2008a) 
Feb.2
006 
Tracking down a kitten abuser (Chen 2006; Cai 2006) 
April 
2006 
Tracking down an online gamer with nickname tong xu men for committing infidelity (No 
author 2006) 
Aug. 
2006 
Tracking down pornography-photo maker (Dong and Liu 2006; Song 2006) 
April 
2007 
Tracking down a man Qian Jun for insulting an old man on street (Wang and Zhang 2008a) 
Aug.
2006 
Tracking down a foreigner for hurling insults at Chinese people (Xu 2008) 
2007 Fact checking the credibility of news by national TV station (Wang 2008; Zhong and Guo 
2008) 
Jan.2
008 
Tracking down a man Wang Fei for committing infidelity (Downey 2010) 
Mar.
2008 
Tracking down an online-shopping cheat (Wang and Zhang 2008b) 
Mar.
2008 
Tracking down a  barbershop owner in Zhengzhou city of Henan province, who charged 
unreasonable prices to his customers (Zhang et al. 2008) 
May 
2008 
Tracking down a girl Gao Qianhui (her online nickname is Zhang Ya) insulting earthquake 
victims (Fletcher 2008) 
Oct. 
2008 
Tracking down a girl Guo Ziyin sold by her father to pay off his debt (Guo, Z. W. 2008) 
Govern
ment/off
icial 
focused 
HFSE 
8 Oct.
2007 
Fact checking the credibility of Shaanxi government’s announcement about existence of the 
South China tiger (Shan 2007) 
June 
2008 
Tracking down a woman with her online nickname ju hua xiang xiang allegedly having 
affair with government officer (Wu 2008) 
Nov.
2008 
Tracking down a corrupt government officer Zhou Jiugeng evidenced by online photos (Xi 
2009) 
Nov.
2008 
Tracking down a government officer Lin Jiaxiang shown in an online footage suspicious of 
assaulting a little girl (Feng 2008) 
Dec.
2009 
Tracking down government officers whose names were shown in a document recording 
details of a luxury trip by a group of government officers (Hartono 2009) 
Feb.
2009 
Fact checking police’s announcement about the investigation on the death of a prisoner Li 
Minqiao in Jinning county prison in Yunnan province (Zhang 2009) 
June 
2009 
Fact checking government’s announcement about the appointment of a young man Zhou 
Senfeng as the mayor of a city in Hubei province (Wang, H. Z. 2009) 
June 
2009 
Fact checking police’s announcement about a young woman Deng Yujiao sentenced to jail 
for her having stabbed a local official to death (Herold 2011) 
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Table 2: Cases of ‘government/official focused’ HFSE 1 
Types of 
government/o
fficial focused 
HFSE 
Case Date Trigger Target 
 
Outcome 
 
 
Target -
punishing 
 
 
Case 1 Jun.2008 A woman posted on the 
Tianya forum a series of 
photos, showing her luxury 
life and messages about her 
relationship with a high-
level government official. 
The woman in the 
series of photos. 
The woman shown in 
these photos was 
identified but she 
denied this and asserted 
she had been played by 
someone else   
Case 2 Nov.2008 A news programme 
showing a public official 
saying that the government 
would punish real estate 
developers who sold houses 
at lower than cost price, 
which incurred public 
outrage due to the reality of 
unaffordable house prices 
in the region. 
 
Zhou Jiugeng, an 
official who 
received public 
criticism because of 
his inappropriate 
remark on house 
prices in an 
interview 
 
Evidence of Zhou’s 
corruption was found 
by Internet users, he 
was dismissed and 
jailed for corruption 
(Moore 2008) 
 
Case 3 
 
Nov.2008  
A cctv footage showing a 
quarrel about an assault on 
a little girl with a man 
claiming loudly he was 
high-level government 
official and nobody could 
touch him. 
 
Lin Jiaxiang, the 
official who was 
filmed  by the 
restaurant’s cctv  
 
 
Lin was identified by 
Internet users and 
dismissed due to his 
public words and deeds 
(Branigan 2008b) 
 
Case 4 Dec. 2009  
Documents found by a 
Shanghai citizen  showing 
the costs of a trip by a 
group of government 
officials and posed it on the 
Internet 
 
Government 
officials who took 
luxury trips to 
foreign attractions. 
 
 
Officials in this luxury 
trip were all identified 
by Internet users, two 
of them were dismissed 
and others were given 
disciplinary warnings 
 
 
 
Fact-checking 
 
Case 5 Oct.2007 Shaanxi  government 
announced via a news 
conference that the South 
China Tiger still existed in 
its wild areas 
Online photos of the 
South China tiger 
that had been 
officially declared 
extinct in Shaanxi 
where these tiger 
photos originally 
emerged. 
Photos were found to be 
faked and the photo 
maker Zhou Zhenglong 
was thus put in prison. 
Case 6 Feb. 2009 Local police’s 
unconvincing explanation 
of a prisoner’ death 
(Allegedly, he died when 
playing ‘Hide and Seek’ 
with other prisoners) 
The group members 
organized by Yunan 
government to 
investigate the 
cause of one 
prisoner’s death 
(Internet users 
wanted to find out if 
these members were 
Public’s question 
speeded up the 
investigation on this 
prisoner’s death, two 
prison guards were 
charged for malpractice 
and the death’s family 
got compensation 
24 
 
‘insider’, which 
may prevent the 
truth from being 
covered) 
 
Case 7 Jun.2009  
A male masters graduate 
was reported as the 
youngest mayor in China, 
which incurred online 
discussion about whether 
the young man was 
appointed due to his family 
connnections rather than his 
capabilities (Xie, L. B. 
2009) 
 
 
The newly 
appointed mayor of 
Yicheng city in 
Hubei province of 
China 
 
 
It was proved by both 
media and Internet 
users that there was 
nothing wrong with the 
mayor’s appointment. 
 
Case 8 Jun. 2009 A female witness Deng 
Yujiao had been sentenced 
to jail for  having stabbed a 
local official to death, 
which triggered online 
discussion about her right to 
violently defend herself 
from sexual assault by local 
government officials 
Local officials who 
were reported to 
have sexually 
assaulted a female 
waiter Deng Yujiao 
in a hotel  
Facing the pressure 
from online uproar and 
media’s question, local 
police re-evaluated 
Deng’s case and finally 
released her after the 
charge on her was 
changed from murder to 
excessive self-defence 
and also due to it was 
medically proved that 
Deng had mental illness 
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 6 
 7 
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 9 
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